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The Evolving Police Power: Some
Observations for a New Century
BY GLENN H. REYNOLDS* & DAVID B. KOPEL**
The conventional wisdom about the scope of state police powers
goes like this: in the early days of the Republic, state regulation was
limited by the common law principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas (you should use what is yours so as not to harm what is
others'), implying that legitimate regulation existed only to prevent
concrete harm to specified interests. Sometime around the (previous)
turn of the century, the story continues, the principle changed from
the old sic utere to the new principle of salus populi est suprema lex
(the good of the public is the supreme law), suggesting that states
could regulate as they chose so long as they claimed to be working to
promote the public safety, welfare, or morality.
Like all such conventional wisdom, this approach is somewhat
simplistic.1 But it captures a large grain of truth. The range of activity
that courts, and legal scholars, view as within the scope of legitimate
regulation is considerably larger than it was previously. In 1886, for
example, influential legal commentator Christopher Tiedeman wrote:
This police power of the State extends to the protection of the
lives, limbs, health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and the
protection of all property within the State. According to the
maxim, sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas, it being of universal
application, it must of course be within the range of legislative
action to define the mode and manner in which every one may
so use his own as not to injure others. Any law which goes
* J. D. Yale Law School (1985); B. A. University of Tennessee (1982). The author
is Professor of Law, University of Tennessee.
** J. D. University of Michigan (1985); B. A. Brown University (1982). The author is
the Research Director, Independent Institute; an Associate Policy Analyst, Cato Institute;
and the Director, Center on Digital Economy, Heartland Institute.
1. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. NOVAK, SALus PoPULI: THE ROOTs OF REGULATION IN
AMERICA, 1787-1873 (1991); William J. Novak, The Well-ordered Market: Law and
Economic Regulation in 19th-Century America, 18 L. & SOC. INQ. 1, 7-10 (1993); Joan
Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REv. 277,336-38 (1998).
[511]
512 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27:511
beyond that principle, which undertakes to abolish rights, the
exercise of which does not involve an infringement of the rights
of others, or to limit the exercise of rights beyond what is
necessary to provide for the public welfare and the general
security, cannot be included in the police power of the
government. It is a governmental usurpation, and violates the
principles of abstract justice, as they have been developed
under our republican institutions.2
By 1904, on the other hand, Ernst Freund could write, with some
measure of plausibility:
But no community confines its care of the public welfare to the
enforcement of the principles of the common law. The state
places its corporate and proprietary resources at the disposal of
the public by the establishment of improvements and services of
different kinds; and it exercises its compulsory powers for the
prevention and anticipation of wrong by narrowing common law
rights through conventional restraints and positive regulations
which are not confined to the prohibition of wrongful acts. It is
this latter kind of state control which constitutes the essence of the
police power. The maxim of this power is that every individual
must submit to such restraints in the exercise of his liberty or of
his rights of property as may be required to remove or reduce the
danger of the abuse of these rights on the part of those who are
unskillful, careless, or unscrupulous.3
In short, then, the traditional view, espoused by Tiedman, was
that state power could legitimately be employed to protect individuals
from direct harm; the newer view, represented by Freund, was that
the state could regulate even to prevent harms that might not occur,
or that might not have been considered harms at all by the common
law.
For some time, it appeared that Freund's view had won the day,
with broad consensus that legislatures could regulate practically
anything so long as they were doing so in the public interest Nor
was the question of whether legislation was really salus populi
something the courts would review: as Justice Douglas famously
remarked in Berman v. Parker, when the legislature has spoken, the
2. CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF THE
POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED STATES, at 4-5, (1886), citing Thorpe v. Rutland R.R., 27
Vt. 140, 149-50 (1854).
3. ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS 6 (Arno Press 1976) (1904) (emphasis in original).
4. See Stokes v. County Clerk, 264 P.2d 959, 961-62 (Cal. 1953) (holding that
requiring disclosure of race and color on application for marriage license is a valid exercise
of police power).
public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive By
the 1980s, in fact, we were arguing over Robert Bork's view that
majorities can legitimately do anything not explicitly prohibited by
the Constitution: outlaw birth control, for example, based solely on
the fact that some people do not like the idea of others having sex for
fun. Bork's view was essentially the same as the Blackstonian view
that nineteenth-century Americans thought had been repudiated by
the American Revolution: "[T]he king is, and ought to be, absolute;
that is, so far absolute that there is no legal authority that can either
delay or resist him... unless where the constitution hath expressly, or
by evident consequence, laid down some exception or boundary;
declaring, that thus far the prerogative shall go and no farther.""
But a curious thing has happened. Just as the expansive view of
state power seemed to have won, cracks began to appear. As we will
demonstrate in the next few pages, courts are now, pace Robert Bork,
circumscribing the legitimate sphere of state authority in ways that
seem more consistent with a sic utere than a salus populi approach.
This not only has obvious implications for the jurisprudence of state
police powers, a subject considered dead for most of this century, but
also raises some broader questions about the evolution of legal
doctrine in general. We will explore both points.
I. Rights and Powers
The salus populi principle that the legislature can do anything it
5. 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
6. See ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW 254-55 (1990). According to Bork:
Suppose that the lawyer for Connecticut in Griswold argued that a majority, or
even an intense and politically influential minority, regarded it as morally
abhorrent that couples capable of procreation should copulate without the
intention, or at least the possibility, of conception. Could the Court
demonstrate that this moral view is wrong or that moral abhorrence is not an
important and legitimate ground for legislation?
Id. at 234. Moreover:
The law prohibiting the use of contraceptives impairs their sexual gratifications.
The state can assert, and at one stage in the litigation did assert, that the
majority of Connecticut's citizens believes that the use of contraceptives is
profoundly immoral. Knowledge that it is taking place and that the state makes
no attempt to inhibit it causes those in the majority moral anguish and so
impairs their gratifications.
Id. at 257-58. For a further discussion of Bork's work in this vein see Glenn Harlan
Reynolds, Sex, Lies and Jurisprudence: Robert Bork Griswold, and the Philosophy of
Original Understanding, 24 GA. L. REV. 1045,1096-1103 (1990).
7. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 250.
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wants, unless expressly forbidden by the Constitution, has always
rested upon a somewhat shaky foundation. For a nation founded on
the notion that the Constitution is the supreme law, binding even
legislatures, the claim that the public good-as determined by the
legislature-is in fact the Supreme Law raises troubling questions.
Certainly it is a view that the Framers would have regarded as
controversial. In the words of Justice Joseph Story:
Whether, indeed, independently of the constitution of the
United States, the nature of republican and free governments
does not necessarily impose some restraints upon the legislative
power, has been much discussed. It seems to be the general
opinion, fortified by a strong current of judicial opinion, that
since the American revolution no state government can be
presumed to possess the trancendental sovereignty to take away
vested rights of property; to take the property of A and transfer
it to B by a mere legislative act. A government can scarcely be
deemed to be free, where the rights of property are left solely
dependent upon a legislative body, without any restraint. The
fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require, that
the rights of personal liberty, and private property should be
held sacred. At least, no court of justice, in this country, would
be warranted in assuming, that any state legislature possessed a
power to violate and disregard them; or that such a power, so
repugnant to the common principles of justice and civil liberty,
lurked under any general grant of legislative authority, or ought
to be implied from any general expression of the will of the
people, in the usual forms of the constitutional delegation of
power. The people ought not to be presumed to part with
rights, so vital to their security and well-being, without very
strong, and positive declarations to that effect.8
In other words, courts should not sit idly by when the legislature
takes property from A to give it to B. Rather than asking "Does the
Constitution expressly forbid such an act?" the courts, according to
Justice Story, should ask, "Does the Constitution expressly allow such
an act which is contrary to common law principles?"
Justice Story, of course, was the most important "pro-
government" judge and legal scholar of the first half of the nineteenth
century, and his Supreme Court decisions created the foundations of
constitutional federalism as we know it. To the legal mind who did
more than any other to augment government power in the early
8. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 510-11 (Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak eds., 1987). Justice Story's spelling
of "trancendental" is different from modem spelling, but not erroneous. Story was writing
before Noah Webster's dictionary standardized American spelling.
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republic, it was obvious that courts could not defer to legislative
judgments that the "public good" required taking A's property to give
to B.
Nor was Story the only figure in early American constitutional
law to take this view. In a famous opinion in Calder v. Bull, the
staunch Federalist Justice Salmon Chase made the same point:
I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a state Legislature, or
that it is absolute and without control; although its authority
should not be expressly restrained by the constitution, or
fundamental law of the state. The people of the United States
erected their constitutions or forms of government, to establish
justice, to promote the general welfare, to secure the blessings
of liberty, and to protect their persons and property from
violence. The purposes for which men enter into society will
determine the nature and terms of the social compact; and as
they are the foundation of the legislative power, they will decide
what are the proper objects of it. The nature, and ends of
legislative power will limit the exercise of it. This fundamental
principle flows from the very nature of our free Republican
governments, that no man should be compelled to do what the
laws do not require; nor to refrain from acts which the laws
permit. There are acts which the federal, or state legislature
cannot do, without exceeding their authority. There are certain
vital principles in our free republican governments, which will
determine and overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse of
legislative power; as to authorize manifest injustice by positive
law; or to take away that security for personal liberty, or private
property, for the protection whereof the government was
established. An act of the legislature (for I cannot call it a law),
contrary to the great first principles of the social compact,
cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.
The obligation of a law in governments established on express
compact, and on republican principles, must be determined by
the nature of the power, on which it is founded
Chase's colleague, Justice James Iredell, agreed that legislative
powers are necessarily finite, and subject to judicial review:
If, then, a government, composed of legislative, executive and
judicial departments, were established, by a constitution which
imposed no limits on the legislative power, the consequence
would inevitably be, that whatever the legislative power chose
to enact, would be lawfully enacted, and the judicial power,
could never interpose to pronounce it void. It is true, that some
speculative jurists have held, that a legislative act against
natural justice must, in itself, be void; but I cannot think that,
under such a government any court of justice would possess a
9. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386,387-88 (1798).
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power to declare it so ....
In order, therefore, to guard against so great an evil, it has been
the policy of all the American states, which have, individually,
framed their state constitutions, since the revolution, and of the
people of the United States, when they framed the federal
constitution, to define with precision the objects of the
legislative power, and to restrain its exercise within marked and
settled boundaries .... There are then two lights, in which the
subject can be viewed. 1st. If the legislature pursue the
authority delegated to them, their acts are valid. 2d. If they
transgress the boundaries of that authority, their acts are
invalid.'0
Or, as Iredell had said earlier, before joining the Court, a
constitution is "a declaration of particular powers by the people to
their representatives, for particular purposes. It may be considered as
a great power of attorney, under which no power can be exercised but
what is expressly given."'1
Future Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, in his first major legal
work-an annotated version of Chancellor Kent's Commentaries
wrote:
[A]cts which can only be justified on the ground that they are
police regulations, must be so clearly necessary to the safety,
comfort, or well-being of society, or so imperatively required by
public necessity, that they must be taken to be impliedly
excepted from the words of the constitutional prohibition.72
Thomas Cooley, the leading constitutional scholar of the second
half of the nineteenth century, explained "the principles.., which
have been settled,"13 regarding the police power: The police power
allowed government to establish rules of good conduct and good
neighborhood which are calculated to prevent a conflict of rights and
to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of corresponding
enjoyment by others. 4 In other words, sic utere.
And although "These rules seldom raise any question of
constitutional authority, it is possible for them to be pushed to an
extreme that shall deny just liberty." 5  Cooley then listed a wide
10. Calder, 3 U.S. at 398-99.
11. GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787, 600
(1969) (quoting Iredell).
12. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 340 n.2 (12th ed. O.W.
Holmes Jr. ed., 1873) (1826).
13. THOMAS M. COOLEY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW iv, 310-
327 (1998) (2d ed. 1891).
14. Id. at 238.
15. Id. at 238-39.
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variety of regulations (regarding divorce, employment, and other
topics) that were legitimate under the police power, but he also
pointed to laws that had been held to be void because they were not a
proper exercise of the police power. 6 (Rather than being voided
because the laws violated some positive, enumerated constitutional
right.)
Notably, even Ernst Freund, the expositor of the broad police
power theory that dominated legal thought in the twentieth century,
emphasized that judicial review was still essential:
Effective judicial limitations on the police power would be
impossible, if the legislature were the sole judge of the necessity
of the measures it enacted . . . [T]he maintenance of private
rights under the requirements of the public welfare is a question
of proportionateness of measures entirely. Liberty and
property yield to the police power, but not to the point of
destruction ....
The question of reasonableness usually resolves itself into this:
is regulation carried to the point where it becomes prohibition,
destruction, or confiscation?
7
For example, Freund pointed out that laws regulating the
disposal of dead bodies were easily justified as safety and health
measures. Yet:
Probably the courts would control legislative discretion were it
exercised in an unreasonable manner. Thus, a legislative
prohibition of cremation on the ground that it is contrary to
good morals, would not be likely to be acquiesced in by the
courts; and as a measure to prevent the concealment of crime, it
16. See Ex Parte Kubach, 85 Cal. 274,276 (1890) (ordinance made it a crime for a city
contractor to require employees to work more than eight hours a day), cited in COOLEY,
supra note 13, at 242 n.5; Gaines v. Burford, 1 Dana (Ky.) 479 (1833) & Violett v. Violett,
2 Dana (Ky.) 323 (1834) (property owner cannot be compelled to improve his own real
estate), cited in COOLEY, supra note 13, at 248.
17. FREUND, supra note 3, at 60-61. Many cases support this proposition. See, e.g.,
Wisconsin M. & P. R.R. Co. v. Jacobsen, 179 U.S. 287, 301 (1900) (holding that statute's
legality depends on "whether it is a reasonable or an unreasonable exercise of legislative
power over the subject matter involved."); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896)
(rejecting argument that upholding Constitutionality of segregation in transportation
could lead to arbitrary legislation because "every exercise of the police power must be
reasonable."); Reagan v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 397 (1894) (holding
that governments may impose rate regulations on business, but courts must inquire if the
regulation "is unjust and unreasonable, and such as to work a practical destruction to
rights of property .... "); Toledo, W. & W. Ry. Co. v. Jacksonsville, 67 Ill. 37, 41 (1873)
(holding that requirement that railroad keep a flagman at every railroad crossing is
unreasonable); Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 373 (1889) (reasoning that small
limitations on property rights are legitimate uses of police power, but that "larger ones
could not be, except by the exercise of the right of eminent domain.").
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might be held to go beyond the reasonable requirements of that18
purpose.
Freund recognized that the police power over health and safety
could be invoked for almost any possible law. Therefore, courts had
to make their own determination if the law in question was in fact a
proper use of the police power:
Yet if the passage of a statute were conclusive evidence of the
existence of the danger and if the necessity of the remedy, the
power of the legislature in the most important field of the
police power would be practically unrestricted. Whatever may
have been or may be in some cases now, the profession of the
courts as to deference to the judgment of the legislature and
unquestioning confidence in its good faith, yet as a matter of
fact courts do not surrender their control as to the necessity or
appropriateness of a safety or health measure. It is been said
that "it is for the legislature to determine the exigency (that is,
the occasion) for the exercise of the power, but it is clearly
within the jurisdiction of the courts to determine what are the
subjects upon which the power is to be exercised and the
reasonableness of that exercise." 19
Freund's lengthy treatise, while containing many, many examples
of laws which were upheld (properly, in Freund's view) also describes
many cases for which Freund applauded the courts for striking
"unreasonable" legislation. Though Freund started from the premise
that the police power authorized an extremely wide variety of
reasonable legislation, even Freund recognized that the power was
finite:
[I]t would be unwarranted to conclude that this power can
always be set in motion, simply to subserve the convenience of
the public. It would be a novel doctrine to assert that the state
could describe what kinds of goods a dry goods merchant shall
keep, how many salesmen he shall employ, how the goods shall
be exhibited to buyers, or how long his store shall be kept open.
The public interest of convenience is not as urgent as that of
health or safety, and hence does not justify similar interference
with private rights.2°
Such views do not prove, of course, that the sic utere approach, in
which legitimate legislation and regulation is limited to the protection
of existing rights from invasion, is the only justification for state
18. FREUND, supra note 3, at 118. Courts are more rigorous in reviewing municipal
legislation than in review state legislation. See id. at 132-33.
19. Id. at 134 (quoting from In re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415,424 (1899)).
20. Id. at 416. Freund added that convenience regulations would be appropriate for a
monopoly, or for a company which had been granted special privileges. See id-
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authority. Besides the police power, governments had their tax
power, their war power, and so on.21
The limitations on the police power do, however, cast
considerable doubt on the correctness of the conventional-wisdom
interpretation of salus populi, in which legislatures are empowered to
regulate for the good of the community, and (short of direct collision
with explicit constitutional prohibitions) only legislatures have the
authority to decide whether that is what they are doing.' As we have
just demonstrated, the notion that the government can rob A for B's
benefit, and conclusively pronounce the robbery to be "for the public
good" and therefore beyond judicial review is not the dominant view
of nineteenth-century legal thought.
For if Justice Iredell's notion of a "great power of attorney" is to
mean anything, it must mean that the power exists only where
exercised for appropriate ends.' And who normally determines
whether a power of attorney has been exceeded? The courts, of
course. One might expect, under this theory, to see courts examining
a particular legislative enactment by weighing its purposes against the
legitimate ends of government (as established, perhaps, by the
relevant federal and/or state constitutions, and by what we know
about what the Framers of both documents considered to be the
legitimate ends of government) and then upholding or striking down
the law based on whether it is consistent with those ends or not.
H. The Modern Cases
Interestingly enough, applying the sic utere principle seems to be
what courts are doing today, in at least a few categories of cases.
21. Freund distinguished the police power from criminal legislation. The latter was
directed at "the punishment of acts intrinsically vicious, evil, and condemned by social
sentiment; the province of the police power is the enforcement of merely conventional
restraints, so that in the absence of positive legislative action, there would be no possible
offense." Id. at 21-22.
22. Such an approach is also inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment, which provides
that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X. This language makes clear that there are some powers of government that are
reserved "to the people" and hence not within the legitimate sphere of either federal or
state governments. Reading the Tenth Amendment together with the Ninth Amendment,
which provides that "[tihe enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people," strengthens this view. U.S.
CONST. amend. IX.
23. Or, in an alternative formulation, where the legislation is "fit for the ordinary
purposes for which laws are passed." See Daniel Farber, The "Unwritten Constitution"
and the U. C. C., 6 CONST. COMMENTARY 217,220 (1989).
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What is even more interesting is that the categories have to do with
things that-at least in the view of contemporary police power
theorists like Bork-should be well within the power of states to
regulate: things like sex, marriage, procreation, and parenting. Yet
the analysis in these cases seems more consistent with the
traditionalist approach than with that of modern state power
enthusiasts such as Bork. It would seem that twenty-first century
advocates of civil liberty are rediscovering their nineteenth-century
roots.
A. Parenting and Procreation
Davis v. Davis24 was a case of first impression. The immediate
question was what rights parents have to frozen embryos. The case
has been enormously influential,' but its importance to our discussion
stems more from its analysis than its outcome.
One part of Davis' analysis dealt with the question of how much
authority the state could exercise to limit individuals' procreational
autonomy. The answer was, not much. According to the Tennessee
Supreme Court, the Tennessee Constitution, together with the
"fundamental maxims of a free government,"'26 prohibits the passage
of laws that are oppressive or interfere with liberty. The Court
continued:
Indeed, the notion of individual liberty is so deeply embedded
in the Tennessee Constitution that it, alone among American
constitutions, gives the people, in the face of governmental
oppression and interference with liberty, the right to resist that
oppression even to the extent of overthrowing the government.
The relevant provisions establishing this distinctive political
autonomy appear in the first two sections of Article I of the
Tennessee Constitution, its Declaration of Rights:
Section 1. All power inherent in the people-Government
under their control.
That all power is inherent in the people, and all free
governments are founded on their authority, and instituted
for their peace, safety, and happiness; for the advancement
of those ends they have at all times, an inalienable and
24. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
25. See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 673 N.Y.S.2d 350, 354 (Ct. App. 1998); Kass v. Kass, 663
N.Y.S.2d 581, 586 (A.D. 2d Dept. 1997); Janicki v. Hospital of St. Raphael, 744 A.2d 963,
970 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999); Hecht v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 846 (1993)
(following or discussing Davis).
26. STORY, supra note 8, at 511; Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 599 (quoting Thiede v. Town of
Scandia Valley, 14 N.W.2d 400,405 (Minn. 1944)).
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indefeasible right to alter, reform, or abolish the
government in such manner as they may think proper.
Section 2. Doctrine of nonresistance condemned.
That government being instituted for the common benefit,
the doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and
oppression is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good
and happiness of mankind 7
Obviously, the drafters of the Tennessee Constitution of 1796
could not have anticipated the need to construe the liberty
clauses of that document in terms of the choices flowing from in
vitro fertilization procedures. But there can be little doubt that
they foresaw the need to protect individuals from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters such as the one now before
us, involving intimate questions of personal and family
concern.28
This passage is striking. The court draws on the first principles of
limited government-after all, a state constitution that grants the
right to revolt against arbitrary and oppressive power can hardly be
construed to grant such power to the government it establishes-as a
source of protection for individual rights, despite the absence of any
direct textual warrant. Though this opinion is steeped in "original
intent," it is a far cry from the majoritarianism that Robert Bork, and
many scholars on the Left routinely champion. It also seems quite
inconsistent with the notion that salus populi est suprema lex. In the
Davis court's approach, the sphere of government is not unlimited,
nor are individual rights narrowly delimited islands of affirmative
textual protection in an otherwise boundless sea of governmental
power. Rather, governmental power is limited within a sea of
27. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 599-600 (quoting the Tennessee Constitution).
28. See i. The "right of revolution" mentioned by the court is not unique to
Tennessee as the court thought. The New Hampshire Constitution declares:
Government being instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security,
of the whole community, and not for the private interest or emolument of any
one man, family, or class of men; therefore, whenever the ends of government
are perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of
redress are ineffectual, the people may, and of right ought to reform the old, or
establish a new government. The doctrine of nonresistance against arbitrary
power, and oppression, is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and
happiness of mankind.
N.H. CONST. art. I, 10. It is, however, possible that Tennessee is the only state whose
official history speaks approvingly of armed rebellion against the duly constituted
authorities. See A History of Tennessee, in STATE OF TENNESSEE, TENNESSEE BLUE
BOOK, 321, 406-07 (1998) (describing the "Battle of Athens," in which ex-GIs shot it out
with the Sheriff and fifty "deputies" defending the corrupt political machine in McMinn
County, Tennessee as the beginning of a statewide cleanup of corrupt politics).
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individual rights. It is worth noting, too, that this is a decision of a
conservative state court, not one noted for its expansiveness in the
creation of new rights.
Davis' progeny are similar in approach. Later cases such as
Hawk v. Hawk29 and In Re Askew' go well beyond the right of
procreational autonomy to recognize a right on the part of parents to
raise children as they see fit, subject to state supervision only in cases
where the parents are unfit and there is a risk of substantial harm to
the child. In Hawk, the court struck down a reasonable-sounding
statute that allowed grandparents visitation rights, on the basis that
the state is without power to intervene in parenting decisions where
there is not a significant risk of substantial harm to the child.3' As
generally positive as grandparent visitation is, the court reasoned, the
state is without power to require it.
B. Sex
More dramatic than the parenting cases are those in which state
sodomy laws have been struck down. Again, the emphasis is on
inherent limitations on state power that appear inconsistent with a
salus populi approach.
In Commonwealth v. Wasson, the court made an exhaustive
inquiry into the power of states to regulate homosexual sodomy."
Rejecting the analysis of the United States Supreme Court in Bowers
v. Hardwick,3 the Kentucky Supreme Court began its analysis with
Section Two of the Kentucky Bill of Rights, which provides that
"[a]bsolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of
freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest
majority. ' 34
The purpose of this provision, the court stated, could be found in
its legislative history:
29. Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 581 (Tenn. 1993) (holding that neither courts nor
legislatures may properly intervene in parenting decisions absent significant harm to the
child from those decisions).
30. In re Askew, 993 S.W.2d 1, (Tenn. 1999).
31. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 581; see also Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1276 (Fla.
1996) (basing action on Fla. Const. Art. I, § 23, an explicit right of privacy).
32. 842 S.W.2d 487,490-97 (Ky. 1993).
33. 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986). The Kentucky Supreme Court does not merely reject
Bowers' analysis; it is almost tart in its juxtaposition of the Ninth Amendment's language
regarding unenumerated rights with the holding in Bowers. See Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at
493.
34. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 491.
The meaning of Sections One and Two as they apply to
personal liberty is found in the remarks of J. Proctor Knott of
Marion County:
"Those who exercise that power in organized society with any
claim of justice, derive it from the people themselves. That with
the whole of such power residing in the people, the people as a
body rest under the highest of all moral obligations to protect
each individual in the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness, provided that he shall in no wise injure his neighbor
in so doing."35
The Wasson court also quoted an earlier decision in which it had
interpreted the Kentucky right of privacy:
Man in his natural state has the right to do whatever he chooses
and has the power to do. When he becomes a member of
organized society, under governmental regulation, he
surrenders, of necessity, all of his natural right the exercise of
which is, or may be, injurious to his fellow citizens. This is the
price that he pays for governmental protection, but it is not
within the competency of a free government to invade the
sanctity of the absolute rights of the citizen any further than the
direct protection of society requires .... It is not within the
competency of government to invade the privacy of a citizen's life
and to regulate his conduct in matters in which he alone is
concerned, or to prohibit him any liberty the exercise of which
will not directly injure society.
[L]et a man therefore be ever so abandoned in his principles, or
vicious in his practice, provided he keeps his wickedness to
himself, and does not offend against the rules of public decency,
he is out of the reach of human laws ....
The theory of our government is to allow the largest liberty to
the individual commensurate with the public safety, or as it has
been otherwise expressed, that government is best which
governs least. Under our institutions there is no room for that
inquisitorial and protective spirit which seeks to regulate the
conduct of men in matters in themselves indifferent, and to
make them conform to a standard, not of their own choosing,
but the choosing of the lawgiver....
[W]e are of the opinion that it never has been within the
competency of the Legislature to so restrict the liberty of this
citizen, and certainly not since the adoption of the present
[1891] Constitution. The Bill of Rights, which declares that
among the inalienable rights possessed by the citizens is that of
seeking and pursuing their safety and happiness, and that the
absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty, and
35. Id. at 494 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting J. Proctor Knott).
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property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in
the largest majority, would be but an empty sound if the
Legislature could prohibit the citizen the right of owning or
drinking liquor, when in so doing he did not offend the laws of
decency by being intoxicated in public.
36
This lengthy quotation from Campbell seems to be the core basis
of the Wasson opinion. As the Wasson court notes, "At the time
Campbell was decided, the use of alcohol was as much an incendiary
moral issue as deviate sexual behavior in private between consenting
adults is today."'37 But, said the Kentucky Supreme Court,
The usual justification for laws against such conduct is that,
even though it does not injure any identifiable victim, it
contributes to moral deterioration of society. One need not
endorse wholesale repeal of all "victimless" crimes in order to
recognize that legislating penal sanctions solely to maintain
widely held concepts of morality and aesthetics is a costly
enterprise. It sacrifices personal liberty, not because the actor's
conduct results in harm to another citizen but only because it is
inconsistent with the majoritarian notion of acceptable
behavior.38
The Commonwealth has tried hard to demonstrate a legitimate
governmental interest justifying a distinction, but has failed....
In the final analysis we can attribute no legislative purpose to
this statute except to single out homosexuals for different
treatment for indulging their sexual preference by engaging in
the same activity heterosexuals are now at liberty to perform
39
Simply because the majority, speaking through the General
Assembly, finds one type of extramarital intercourse more
offensive than another, does not provide a rational basis for
criminalizing the sexual preference of homosexuals. °
One could hardly imagine a more devastating reply to the notion
of generally unlimited legislative power than this one. Nor is the
Kentucky Supreme Court alone in this regard. Many other state
courts, in striking down sodomy laws under their state constitutions,
36. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 494-95 (quoting Commonwealth v. Campbell, 117 S.W.
383,385-87 (Ky. 1909).
37. Id. at 495.
38. Id. at 498 (quoting A.L.I., MODEL PENAL ODE AND COMMENTARIES, Part II.,
1980 ed., pp. 371-72).
39. Id. at 501.
40. Id. at 502.
have set a similar tone.
In Commonwealth v. Bonadio, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
took a similar line in striking down that state's sodomy law:
With respect to regulation of morals, the police power should
properly be exercised to protect each individual's right to be
free from interference in defining and pursuing his own
morality but not to enforce a majority morality on persons
whose conduct does not harm others. Many issues that are
considered to be matters of morals are subject to debate, and no
sufficient state interest justifies legislation of norms simply
because a particular belief is followed by a number of people, or
even a majority. Indeed, what is considered to be "moral"
changes with the times and is independent upon societal
background. Spiritual leadership, not the government, has the
responsibility for striving to improve the morality of individuals.
Enactment of the Voluntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse
Statute, despite the fact that it provides punishment for what
many believe to be abhorrent crimes against nature and
perceived sins against God, is not properly in the realm of the
temporal police power.
Likewise, in Campbell v. Sundquist, a Tennessee appellate court
struck down the state's sodomy law on similar grounds. "Even," said
the court, "if we assume that the Homosexual Practices Act
represents a moral choice of the people of this State, we are
unconvinced that the advancement of this moral choice is so
compelling as to justify the regulation of private, noncommercial,
sexual choices between consenting adults simply because those adults
happen to be of the same gender., 42  The court went on to cite
Wasson (which it characterized as holding "that the will of the
majority could not be imposed upon the minority absent some
showing of harmful consequences created by the actions of the
minority") and Bonadio (including a lengthy quotation that included
the passage set out above).43 The Campbell court, like the Tennessee
Supreme Court in Davis v. Davis, also relied heavily on Article I,
Sections 1 and 2 of the Tennessee Constitution, which stress the
proper ends of government and the right of revolt against government
that proves arbitrary and oppressive.44
41. Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 50 (Pa. 1980) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
42. Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250,265 (Tenn. App. 1996).
43. Id. at 265-66.
44. Id. at 261-62. The court also quotes the Prohibition-era Cravens v. State, 256
S.W. 431 (1923), for its strong language on the sanctity of the home as against state
regulation.
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Similarly, in the case of Powell v. State, the Supreme Court of
Georgia, citing Wasson, Bonadio, and Campbell, struck down
Georgia's sodomy law as outside the police power.45 According to that
court:
In [Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance] the Court found
the right of privacy to be "ancient law," with "its foundation in
the instincts of nature[,]" derived from "the Roman's
conception of justice" and natural law, making it immutable and
absolute. The Court described the liberty interest derived from
natural law as "embrac[ing] the right of man to be free in the
enjoyment of the faculties with which he has been endowed by
his Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for
the common good." "Liberty" includes "the right to live as one
will, so long as that will does not interfere with the rights of
another or of the public" ..... Stated succinctly, the Court
ringingly endorsed the "right 'to be let alone' so long as [one]
was not interfering with the rights of other individuals or of the
public."46
"Police power" is the governing authority's ability to legislate
for the protection of the citizens' lives, health, and property,
and to preserve good order and public morals.... That the
legislative body has determined that it is properly exercising its
police powers "is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the
supervision of the courts." Thus, the suggestion that OCGA §
16-6-2 is a valid exercise of the police power requires us to
consider whether it benefits the public generally without unduly
oppressing the individual. Since, as determined earlier, the only
possible purpose for the statute is to regulate the private
conduct of consenting adults, the public gains no benefit, and
the individual is unduly oppressed by the invasion of the right to
privacy. Consequently, we must conclude that the legislation
exceeds the permissible bound of the police power.47
A concurring opinion added:
The individual's right to freely exercise his or her liberty is not
dependent upon whether the majority believes such exercise to
be moral, dishonorable, or wrong. Simply because something is
beyond the pale of "majoritarian morality" does not place it
beyond the scope of constitutional protection. To allow the
moral indignation of a majority (or, even worse, a loud and/or
radical minority) to justify criminalizing private consensual
conduct would be a strike against freedoms paid for and
45. Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998).
46. Id. at 22 (citations omitted) (quoting Pavesich v. New England Life Ins., 50 S.E.
68 (Ga., 1905)).
47. Id. at 25 (citing Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47,49-50 (Pa. 1980)).
preserved by our forefathers. Majority opinion should never
dictate a free society's willingness to battle for the protection of
its citizens' liberties. To allow such a thing would, in and of
itself, be an immoral and insulting affront to our constitutional
democracy.4
C. Marriage
That such reasoning is not limited solely to matters involving
sexual freedom is demonstrated by the Vermont Supreme Court's
decision in Baker v. State,49 in which Vermont's ban on homosexual
marriages was struck down. We will not discuss that opinion at length
here, as it will no doubt receive more than enough discussion from
other quarters, and as some aspects of the opinion are sui generis and
furnish only limited authority where other states are concerned.
(Vermont, for example, explicitly permits adoptions by same-sex
couples, something that most states do not, and something that the
Vermont Supreme Court obviously found significant in its analysis.)"
Nonetheless, the core holding in Baker is consistent with the analysis
above: majority sentiment, however deeply held, does not constitute a
legitimate basis for a statute disadvantaging a minority in the absence
of some empirical evidence of harm to others."
In this regard-its holding that legal restrictions and
disadvantages are not legitimate if they are merely what one might
regard as "takings" of liberty from one class of persons for the
gratification or advancement of another class of persons rather than
the community as a whole52-Baker is consistent with our analysis,
48. Id. at 27 (Sears, J., concurring).
49. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
50. See id. at 885.
51. Id. Baker held that the test is whether "the law bears a reasonable and just
relation to the government purpose," which must be the "common benefit of the
community" and not just for the advantage of persons "who are a part only of that
community." Id. at 878-79.
The State's remaining claims (e.g., recognition of same-sex unions might
foster marriages of convenience or otherwise affect the institution in
"unpredictable" ways) may be plausible forecasts as to what the future may
hold, but cannot reasonably be construed to provide a reasonable and just
basis for the statutory exclusion. The State's conjectures are not, in any
event, susceptible to empirical proof before they occur.... [T]o the extent
that state action historically has been motivated by an animus against a class,
that history cannot provide a legitimate basis for continued unequal
application of the law.
Id. at 885.
52. See Reynolds, supra note 6, at 1096-1103.
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and perhaps foreshadows future decisions.
Il. The Implications
A. What is the Proper Scope of the Police Power?
The principle established by these cases is straightforward. State
legislatures and local governments have a police power to enact laws
for the benefit of public safety, health, welfare, and even morality.
But those laws are subject to judicial review as to whether the
legislation is reasonably related to those purposes. And the purposes,
while broad, are not infinite. Even absent specific prohibitions (e.g.,
free speech), the legislature is without power to regulate entirely
private conduct that poses no risk of harm to others. Majoritarian
disapproval of the private conduct (Robert Bork's "moral anguish")53
is not a cognizable form of "harm" for the purposes of this analysis.
As Joseph Story put it:
The fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require,
that the rights of personal liberty, and private property should
be held sacred. At least, no court of justice, in this country,
would be warranted in assuming, that any state legislature
possessed a power to violate and disregard them; or that such a
power, so repugnant to the common principles of justice and
civil liberty, lurked under any general grant of legislative
authority, or ought to be implied from any general expression of
the will of the people, in the usual forms of the constitutional
delegation of power. The people ought not to be presumed to
part with rights, so vital to their security and well-being, without
very strong, and positive declarations to that effect."
Indeed, Story's language is even quoted in Davis v. Davis.
51
These cases are not the only examples of this kind of reasoning,
but are certainly strong evidence of a strain of thought not accounted
for by the Borkian view so common in recent decades. 6
Furthermore, the cases come from states and courts generally
regarded as conservative, both in politics and in judicial philosophies.
53. See id.
54. STORY, supra note 8, at 511.
55. 842 S.W.2d at 599.
56. See, e.g., Schmitt v. State, 590 So. 2d 404, 410 (Fla. 1991) (holding that harmless
and discreet acts are never "lascivious" merely because they are unorthodox; rather, they
must substantially intrude upon the rights of third parties); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d
476, 485-86 (1980) (striking down New York sodomy statute on grounds of equal
protection); Williams v. Pryor 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1274 (N.D. Ala., 1999) (Alabama anti-
vibrator statute lacked rational basis).
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And they are, in fact, conservative decisions far more consistent with
the views of the Framers and early commentators than are the views
of many self-described modem conservatives who espouse a doctrine
of legislative supremacy outside narrowly interpreted bill of rights
protections. Interestingly, these decisions are often rooted in rather
mature sources: the Wasson case cites an 1891 provision of the
Kentucky constitution and a 1909 case interpreting it; the Powell case
cites a 1905 Georgia decision; and the Campbell case quotes a 1923
Tennessee case on the sanctity of the home.
Perhaps the renascence of this analysis represents the arrival of a
new cycle in constitutional philosophy. Certainly much scholarly
literature in recent years has suggested that such cycles are a natural
and inevitable consequence of common-law style adjudication. 7
There is even reason to think that they may be beneficial, by
reinvigorating ossified political positions and reducing the ability of
special interest groups to block change.'
The next question is whether the reasoning in these cases will
find application outside the context of parenting, procreation, and
sodomy laws. Certainly the logic of these cases, that the police power
may not be invoked simply for moral disapproval of purely private
conduct where there is no harm to third parties, would seem
applicable in all sorts of other contexts. One example being the home
cultivation of small quantities of marijuana for personal
consumption." Another being laws against obscenity, where it is
57. See, e.g., Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of
Civil Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 993 (1990); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Is
Democracy Like Sex? 48 VAND. L. REV. 1635 (1995); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Chaos and
the Court, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 110 (1991); J.B. RuhI, The Arrow of the Law in Modern
Administrative States, 30 U.C. DAViS L. REv. 405 (1997); J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as
a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-Society System, 45 DUKE L.J. 849 (1996);
58. See Reynolds, Chaos and the Court, supra note 57, at 116; Reynolds, Is
Democracy Like Sex?, supra note 57, at 1660.
59. Such an approach would certainly be consistent with the Campbell opinion
quoted in Wasson, 842 S.W.3d at 494-95 (holding no legitimate legislative interest in
private liquor consumption). See also Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska, 1975) (holding
that ban on smoking marijuana in own home is beyond legislative power); but cf Laird v.
State, 342 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 1977). As for the medical use of marijuana, Freund observed, in
connection with liquor:
All prohibitory laws make an exception in favor of sales for medical
purposes. This is not a legislative indulgence but a constitutional necessity,
since the state could not validly prohibit the use of valuable curative agencies
on account of remote possibility of abuse. "[T]he power of the legislature to
prohibit the prescription and sale of liquor to be used as medicine does not
exist, and its exercise would be as purely arbitrary as the prohibition of its sale
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viewed in one's own home and where no innocents are harmed in its
production or otherwise exposed to it.6° Or perhaps laws even against
obesity and high-fat foods, currently foreshadowed by legislative
efforts to declare that an individual's fatness is a "disease" that harms
"public health."'" Certainly the general principle set out by Story et
al. above would seem to apply to all sorts of activities.
It should be emphasized that a proper judicial role in enforcing
the limits of the police power is not limited to "hot-button" issues of
personal autonomy such as raising children, consuming marijuana or
high-fat food, or having sex. Even in contexts for which the police
power, generally speaking, is unquestioned-such as fire protection-
courts have stricken fire safety rules after finding that rules in
question do not actually contribute to public safety, health, or
welfare.6'
These cases do not suggest that "morality" is never a legitimate
basis for exercise of the police power. In Samuel Williston's classic
formulation, the police power may be used for "safety, health, morals
and the general welfare of the public."63 For example, posting the
Ten Commandments in a public park may be intended to promote
morality, but religious establishment concerns aside, it is not
necessarily inconsistent with proper use of the police power.' Thus,
conduct that might be outlawed in public spaces (to protect the
morality of "the public") cannot necessarily come within the scope of
the police power when the conduct takes place in a private home,
from which "the public" is excluded. Protecting public morality is not
for religious purposes...."
The right to an adequate supply of medicines cannot be cut off by the
legislature, and when legal provisions would have such effect they must that
extent be inoperative.
FREUND, supra note 3, at 210-11 (quoting Sarrls v. Commonwealth, 83 Ky. 327, 332-33
(1885)).
60. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,565 (1969) (declaring ban on simple
possession of obscenity unconstitutional). But see United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701,
710 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that downloading of Internet pornography not protected
under Stanley if the defendants transported pornography for commercial purposes).
61. S.B. 34, 62d General Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (CO 2000).
62. See Colorado Springs v. Grueskin, 422 P.2d 384,388 (CO 1967) (en banc)
(striking down gasoline delivery regulations after expert testimony showed that the
regulations did not protect public safety).
63. Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L. Q. 365,375-76 (1921).
64. If there is a problem with posting the Ten Commandments, the problem arises
from the First Amendment's establishment clause, and not from the police power. Should
a city council vote to post "Ten Secular Standards of Good Moral Conduct," the act would
be within the police power.
synonymous with imposing criminal sanctions on private actions.
65
B. Judicial Activism?
While more and more courts are taking their duty to police the
boundaries of the police power seriously, the fear of being charged
with "judicial activism" may steer some courts toward a narrow,
positivistic interpretation of rights against government (though
seldom toward such a narrow interpretation of government powers).
Yet policing the boundaries of government power, determining the
extent of Justice Iredell's "great power of attorney," is part of the
judicial role. Ensuring that legislatures do not overstep the bounds
established for government power in "free and republican"
governments is not judicial activism, but judicial fidelity.
Finally, it is no objection to meaningful judicial review of the
police power to point out that courts will sometimes draw the line
differently from where a critic might have drawn it. Any form of
judicial line-drawing-of the scope of the First Amendment, or of the
Interstate Commerce Clause, or of common law concepts such as
"duress" or "detrimental reliance" necessarily involves human
judgment in which judges may differ. This article's recitation of the
various nineteenth and twentieth century cases imposing limits on the
police power does not mean that we think every listed case was
correctly decided.' The point of this article is not to specify what
judges should decide about the exact limits of the police power; the
point is that judges, quite properly, are once again recognizing that
there are limits.
Almost any time that courts perform their duty of judicial
review- especially in a context that requires judgment rather than
mechanically following a statute-allegations are raised that judges
are using judicial review as a pretext for imposing their own policy
preferences. While the risks of judicial policy-making cannot be
eliminated, there is no reason why judicial review of the exercise of
the police power should be avoided, any more than judicial review of
any other common law principle. Proper use of the traditional police
65. Freund suggested that the proper question was whether the immoral act was
taking place in public-such as soliciting a streetwalker, or selling obscenity as a matter of
business, or was beyond the notice of "a non-consenting party"-such as "purely private
correspondence though of an immoral character (arranging for an assignation, etc.)"
FREUND, supra note 3, at 483 n.31. Likewise, laws against the sale of liquor were
reasonable, but laws against private consumption would not be. See id. at 484-85.
66. For example, Kopel does not agree with the Vermont court's decision in the gay
marriage case.
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power standards, in fact, helps guide judges so as to avoid inserting
personal preferences, as illustrated in State v. Brenan, a recent
Louisiana case.67
In Brenan, the state legislature had completely barred the sale of
"obscene devices" for "genital stimulation" (vibrators, dildos, and the
like).6 The state's asserted interest was preventing the sale of these
products to minors, and preventing non-consenting adults from being
offended by seeing the devices on sale. 9 Without needing to reach
privacy issues, a three-judge panel of the Louisiana Court of Appeals
unanimously declared the statute void.70 The opinion explained that
the police power includes "only those laws which are reasonably
related to the promotion of a public good such as health, safety, or
welfare."'" Protection of minors and non-consenting adults was a
public good, the court explained, but a complete prohibition on sales
was not "reasonable." Minors could be protected by a law requiring
proof of age to buy the products, and non-consenting adults could be
protected by laws regulating the display of the products. 3 Hence, the
complete ban on sales was not a proper exercise of the police
powers.74
Robert Bork often criticizes judges who hand down such
decisions as being libertines who are imposing their own values on
more conservative communities. Not so in the Brenan case; two of
the three judges added a special concurring opinion whose first
paragraph stated, "We personally find the items seized to be
shameful, reprehensible, and disgusting."'75 But because the statute
exceeded the police power, it was void.
These cases also illustrate an important way in which state
constitutions matter. The national focus of legal education and
scholarship tends to center our attention on the federal Constitution,
sometimes to the point that we forget that it is only one of fifty-one
constitutions in the United States. We are used to thinking of the
states as laboratories for policy experimentation but less commonly as
laboratories for constitutional experimentation. Of course, they are
67. 739 So. 2d 368,374 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1999).
68. Id. at 372.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 372-73.
71. Id. at 371.
72. Id. at 372.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 373 (Carter, C.J. and Whipple, J., concurring).
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C. The Police Power's Intersection with Federal Constitutional
Adjudication
Thus far, our discussion has dealt entirely with state court cases.
This is because state governments have a police power, and the
federal government does not. Indeed, the first case on congressional
powers in most modem constitutional law textbooks is the leading
case that explicitly affirms that congressional authority "[t]o regulate
Commerce... among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes"
is not equivalent to a police power.76
Nevertheless, the intellectual currents moving through the state
courts are also visible in the U.S. Supreme Court. First of all, the
Court has firmly rejected the notion that the federal legislature has
the final power to judge the legality of the exercise of the federal
legislature's powers. 7
Second, even with regard to state legislation, the Court is making
it clear that legislative powers are finite. Instead of saying that a
particular act of a state government "exceeds the police power," the
Court finds that the particular act fails the Fourteenth Amendment's
"rational basis" test. Rejecting the view that any possible justification
for a law is sufficient for a "rational basis" to exist, the Court has used
"rational basis" with bite to strike down zoning law, state residency
law, and anti-gay rights law.78 That the Court says "Fourteenth
Amendment limits" instead of "police power limits" does not really
change the underlying process of judicial review, for "[t]he textual
76. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,552 (1995) (quoting U.S. CONST. art I, §8).
77. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566.
78. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.620 (1996) (holding that anti-gay rights ballot
measure fails rational basis test); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985)
(finding zoning regulations irrational because they do not achieve their asserted,
legitimate goals); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985) (holding that tax credit for
purchasers of out-of-state cars that only state residents could receive violated the Equal
Protection Clause; decision was not based on the right to interstate travel); Hooper v.
Barnalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985) (rejecting tax exemptions for person who
is a resident before a particular date); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869,
883 (1985) (eliminating statute that gave tax preference to domestic insurance industries);
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (finding that payment of benefits to state residents
based on length of residence violated Equal Protection Clause; right to travel not
invoked); Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181,185 (1976) (finding a reasonable basis
existed to provide married women with Social Security benefits not available to divorced
women); cf. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495,510 (1976) (finding a reasonable basis existed
to permit Congress to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate children for Social
Security benefits).
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pegs in the Fourteenth Amendment... did not create the prohibition
on class legislation; rather, they merely reflected the scope of the
police power[.]"79
Perhaps the renascence of police power jurisprudence in the
state courts will help the United States Supreme Court give
meaningful content to the Federal Constitution's Privileges and
Immunities Clause, which the Court has recently rediscovered.'
Given that that clause is binding on both the states and the Federal
government, state courts might play an important role in fleshing out
its meaning by asking whether particular government actions fall
within the legitimate sphere of state power. That is, does an action
have the role of protecting third parties from harm, or is it rather
intended to exert "that inquisitorial and protective spirit which seeks
to regulate the conduct of men in matters in themselves indifferent,
and to make them conform to a standard, not of their own choosing,
but the choosing of the lawgiver?"81
Finally, it should be noted judicial recognition that the police
79. Jeffrey Rosen, Class Legislation, Public Choice, and the Structural Constitution,
21 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y. 181,187 (1997) (emphasis in original). As Freund
explained:
It is an elementary principle of equal justice, that where the public welfare
requires something to be given or done, the burden be imposed or distributed
upon some rational basis. This principle lies at the foundation of the law of
taxation, and applies equally to the police power. With reference to the latter
it may be expressed by saying that to justify the imposition of a burden there
must be some connection of causation or responsibility between the person
selected or the right impaired and the danger to public welfare or the public
burden which is sought to be avoided or relieved.
FREUND, supra note 3, at 635. That the principle is not the novel creation of the
Fourteenth Amendment is underscored by the first case Freund used for illustration: an
1855 Illinois decision striking down a railroad liability law. Freund specifies:
[R]ailroads were liable to pay the expenses of a coroner's inquest and burial
not only if a person should be killed by its cars or machinery or any accident
thereto, but also if any person should die on any of its cars. If a person
happens to die on a railroad car from illness, there is evidently not the
slightest causal connection between the business of the railroad company and
the public inconvenience and loss for which the statute seeks to make the
railroad company responsible.
Id. (citing Ohio & Mississippi Ry. Co. v. Lackey, 78 Ill. 55,57 (1875)).
80. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501 (1999) (rooting right to travel in "privileges
and immunities" clause of 14th Amendment to Federal Constitution). Cf. Laurence
Tribe, Saenz sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival Portend the Future -
or Reveal the Structure of the Present? 113 Harv. L. Rev. 110, 112 (1999) ("certain rights
... partake simultaneously of personal self-government and of the system of definitions
and relations that describe the form of state and federal self-government that the original
Constitution as modified by the Fourteenth Amendment brought about.").
81. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 494-95.
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power is not infinite helps protect a variety of federal and state
constitutional rights. The 1990s cases obviously have important
implications for privacy and associational rights, and (derivatively)
for protection from searches and seizures in homes and other
personal spaces. And as Richard Epstein points out, a police power
that is allowed to grow out of control quickly turns into a way for the
government to evade the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause.'
Conclusion
In several recent decisions such as United States v. Lopez,
Seminole Tribe, Printz, and City of Boerne v. Flores, the United
States Supreme Court has begun to emphasize the importance of
limited government at the federal level. The cases we have discussed
here likewise appear to represent the beginnings of the rediscovery of
limited government at the state level.
In a way, this should come as no surprise. The Framers, after all,
show no signs of having been enthusiasts for unlimited government at
any level. As Dan Farber has pointed out:
Although the boundaries of that common understanding may
be unclear, it does seem reasonable to assume that the framers
took for granted the concept of limited government. In giving
the federal government the power to govern the District of
Columbia, for example, the framers probably did not believe
that they were granting despotic authority over the residents
(even though the Bill of Rights did not yet exist). Rather, they
probably had in mind commonly accepted limitations on
government.8
Such limitations, courts appear to be rediscovering, are implied
in the grant of governmental power contained in both state and
federal constitutions.' The implication isn't new-it was regarded as
uncontroversial by Justices as divergent in views as Story, Iredell, and
Chase almost two centuries ago-but its rediscovery is.
This rediscovery has important consequences for the affirmative
statements of rights contained in both federal and state constitutions
as well. In the absence of general limitations on government power,
courts confronted with unjust laws have been forced either to contort
82. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD, 128-148 (1995).
83. Daniel Farber, The "Unwritten Constitution" and the U.C.C., 6 CONST.
COMMENTARY 217,220 (1989).
84. Cf. Brannon P. Denning & Brooks R. Smith, Uneasy Riders: The Case for a
Truth-in-Legislation Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. -(forthcoming) (discussing the
renewed enforcement, by state courts, of substantive limitations on the form that
legislation may take).
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affirmative rights protections to allow such laws to be struck down, or
to allow manifestly unjust laws to stand because they could not find a
way to bring them within the ambit of affirmative rights. The result
has been a jurisprudence of rights that is both overexpansive and
confused, because it attempts to compensate for a jurisprudence of
government power that is itself overexpansive and confused.
Focusing on the legitimacy of government power-whether a
particular power claimed by the government can properly be
considered part of Iredell's "great power of attorney," or Story's
"general delegation"--avoids many of these problems. As the cases
discussed in this essay illustrate, it will seldom be difficult for courts
to identify laws that are passed for improper reasons. Measuring the
fit between a statute and "legitimate governmental purposes" is likely
to be both less difficult and less controversial than determinations of
whether or not to "discover" a new positive right. Indeed, it is
noticeable that the many gay-rights decisions mentioned above did
not create any significant backlash in their states, even though those
states are often generally regarded as conservative. Perhaps this is
because language about limited governmental power suits Americans,
and American political culture, more often than does language about
new positive rights.
Perhaps this last point should come as no surprise either, at this
moment in history. The twentieth century was the century of
governmental power expanded to a maximum. It is perhaps no
coincidence that it was also the century that saw more war, and more
government-sponsored genocide and slaughter, than any other in
memory. As Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights John
Shattuck notes, in the twentieth century, "the number of people killed
by their own governments under authoritarian regimes is four times
the number killed in all this century's wars combined."' As Neal
Stephenson reminds us, the twentieth century was one in which limits
on state power were removed in order to let
the intellectuals run with the ball, and they screwed everything
up and turned the century into an abattoir.... We Americans
are the only ones who didn't get creamed at some point during
all of this. We are free and prosperous because we have
inherited political and value systems fabricated by a particular
set of eighteenth-century intellectuals who happened to get it
85. Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Fifth Auxiliary Right, 104 YALE
L.J. 995, 1025-26 n.141 (1995) (quoting Shattuck).
right. But we have lost touch with those intellectuals.8
Given the dreadful record of the twentieth century's experiment
with government power unleashed in the name of public good, a
renewed appreciation for government power of a more modest sort
might be a good thing. In rediscovering the Framers' conception of
limited government, these cases may serve to point the way.
86. NEAL STEPHENSON, IN THE BEGINNING... WAS THE COMMAND LINE 53
(1999).
Spring 20001 EVOLVING POLICE POWER
538 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27:511
